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Abstract
The Austrian eID system constitutes a main pillar within the Austrian e-
Government strategy. The eID system ensures unique identification and se-
cure authentication for citizens protecting access to applications where sensitive
and personal data is involved. In particular, the Austrian eID system supports
three main use cases: Identification and authentication of Austrian citizens,
electronic representation, and foreign citizen authentication at Austrian public
sector applications. For supporting all these use cases, several components – ei-
ther locally deployed in the applications’ domain or centrally deployed – need to
communicate with each other. While local deployments have some advantages
in terms of scalability, still a central deployment of all involved components
would be advantageous, e.g. due to less maintenance efforts. However, a central
deployment can easily lead to load bottlenecks because theoretically the whole
Austrian population as well as – for foreign citizens – the whole EU population
could use the provided services. To mitigate the issue on scalability, in this
paper we propose the migration of main components of the ecosystem into a
public cloud. However, a move of trusted services into a public cloud brings
up new obstacles, particular with respect to privacy. To bypass the issue on
privacy, in this paper we propose an approach on how the complete Austrian
eID ecosystem can be moved into a public cloud in a privacy-preserving man-
ner by applying selected cryptographic technologies (in particular using proxy
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re-encryption and redactable signatures). Applying this approach, no sensitive
data will be disclosed to a public cloud provider by still supporting all three
main eID system use cases. We finally discuss our approach based on selected
criteria.
Keywords: Electronic identity (eID); identity management; Austrian eID
system; cloud computing; public cloud; privacy; proxy re-encryption;
redactable signatures.
1. Introduction
Unique identification and secure authentication are essential processes espe-
cially in security-sensitive areas of application such as e-Government or e-Health.
In particular, these processes play a key role if sensitive data is processed. To
ensure a high level of security for citizen applications in these areas, many Euro-
pean countries have already rolled out national eID solutions supporting unique
identification and secure authentication. In Austria, the Austrian citizen card
is the official eID for citizens [1].
In general, the Austrian e-Government strategy foresees a thorough eID con-
cept based on the Austrian citizen card, which constitutes the core component
for secure identification and authentication of citizens at Austrian e-Government
applications. Moreover, the Austrian eID concept also contains representative
authentications and authentications of foreign EU citizens, which are treated
equally to Austrian citizens in e-Government scenarios. Hence, the main func-
tions of the Austrian eID system are Austrian citizen identification and au-
thentication at online applications, citizen authentication on behalf of a natural
or legal person, and the support of foreign citizen authentication at Austrian
e-Government applications.
To make these main functions work, the Austrian Austrian eID system in-
volves several other components – besides the Austrian citizen card – which
are interconnected to each other. Key components, amongst others, are for in-
stance MOA-ID (Module for Online Applications – Identification) [2], an open
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source software component locally deployed in each service providers domain fa-
cilitating citizen card access, the MIS (Management Issuing Service) [3], which
constitutes a central service issuing electronic mandates, or the SPR-GW (Sour-
cePIN Register-Gateway) [4], which a central gateway supporting registration
of foreign citizens in Austrian national population registers. Details on the in-
dividual components will be given in Section 4.2. Currently, the Austrian eID
system treats several deployed MOA-ID instances as well as the MIS and the
SPR-GW as trusted entities. While the local deployment model has indeed some
benefits, particularly with respect to scalability, in some situations a centralized
deployment approach – besides the MIS and the SPR-GW – also of MOA-ID
may be preferable. However, in terms of scalability (theoretically the whole
Austrian population could use these central services for identification and au-
thentication at service providers) the existing approaches may reach their limits.
This can easily lead to load bottlenecks at MOA-ID, the MIS, or the SPR-GW.
While the use of electronic mandates and foreign citizen authentications are
still in its start-up phase, frequent usages are to be expected in the future. The
use of electronic mandates in Austria gets increasing popularity. For instance,
professional representation or natural-to-legal person representation constitute
daily business in legal procedures. Additionally, representation of parents for
their children or children for elderly people are frequent use cases especially in
health services. Furthermore, cross-border identifications are steadily increas-
ing because the European Commission currently heavily pushes the STORK
framework [5], which will be probably the dominant authentication framework
across Europe in the future.
Coping with such increased load may not be easy to handle within the cur-
rent central deployment scenarios, where each entity is deployed in a trusted
data center. Therefore, the authors propose a move of important components
of the Austrian eID system (e.g., MOA-ID, MIS, SPR-GW) into a public cloud.
Deployment in a public cloud could definitely mitigate any scalability issues
due to the characteristics (high scalability, high elasticity, cost reduction, etc.)
provided by a public cloud environment. However, a move of such trusted ser-
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vice into a public cloud brings up new obstacles, particularly with respect to
citizens privacy [6, 7, 8]. Although privacy and security are one of the main
issues of public clouds, we still consider the public cloud as the most promising
cloud deployment model for a migration of governmental services such as the
Austrian eID infrastructure into the cloud. The reasons are – amongst others
– particularly the ability to absorb unforeseeable load peaks almost seamlessly
and its huge cost savings potential compared to other cloud deployment models
[9, 10]. While privacy in the current scenarios is ensured through organizational
means, in this paper we illustrate how such a move of trusted services of the
Austrian eID system into a public cloud can be successfully realized using cryp-
tographic technologies (by particularly using proxy re-encryption and redactable
signatures) by still preserving citizens privacy.
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly explains related work in
the context of identity management. Cryptographic building blocks our work
is based on are described in Section 3. In Section 4 the Austrian eID system
and its individual components are described in detail. In addition, the three
main supported use cases (identification and authentication of Austrian citizens,
in representation, and of foreign citizens) and corresponding process flows are
explained. How the individual components can be moved into a public cloud in a
privacy-preserving manner and how the process flows will change is elaborated
in Section 5. In Section 6 we discuss our approach with respect to security,
privacy, and practicability. Finally, we draw conclusions in Section 7.
2. Related Work
Identity management is no new topic and thus several identity management
solutions exist. In this section we briefly outline a couple of identity management
systems that have evolved over the past years [11, 12, 13, 14].
First systems arose due to the need of managing employee’s accounts in
single organizations. User and identity data was simply stored in directories
such as LDAP (Lightweight Directory Access Protocol). In this case, the scope
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of the identity management system was limited to this single organization.
Since the need for cross-organizational communication and hence exchang-
ing identification and authentication data across domains gained importance,
more sophisticated identity management solutions have established. One early
example of such systems is Kerberos [15], which enables secure and uniform
authentication in insecure TCP/IP networks. While additionally the WWW
became increasingly popular at this time, identity management systems on ap-
plication level arose.
One example for a central identity management system was Microsoft Pass-
port (latterly called Windows Live ID1). Other systems, which follow a decen-
tralized and federated architecture, were the Liberty Alliance Project2 (that
evolved to the Kantara initiative3) or Shibboleth4. Both projects, Liberty Al-
liance and Shibboleth, influenced the development of the current version of the
Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML 2.0)[16]. SAML defines one of the
most important standards dealing with Single Sign-On (SSO) and identity fed-
eration at the present time. Contrary to SAML, which is XML-based, OpenID5
or OpenID Connect6 rely on more light-weight protocols or data structures for
identity data exchange, e.g., simple URL parameters or JSON Tokens. However,
both OpenID and OpenID Connect model similar use cases like SAML. Other
systems, which are deployed in the field but gained less importance so far are,
e.g., WS-Federation[17], Windows Cardspace7, or the Central Authentication
Service (CAS)8.
Unique identification and secure authentication are also essential in sensi-
tive areas of application, e.g., in e-Government or e-Business. Many European
1https://login.live.com
2http://www.projectliberty.org
3http://kantarainitiative.org
4http://shibboleth.net
5http://openid.net/specs/openid-authentication-2_0.html
6http://openid.net/connect/
7http://msdn.microsoft.com/en-us/library/aa480189.aspx
8http://www.jasig.org/cas
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countries have already rolled-out national eID solutions to their citizens, mostly
based on smart cards or mobile phones. Examples of such national solutions
are the German nPA [18], the Belgian BELPIC [19], or the Austrian citizen
card [1] (latter will be detailed in one of the next sections). Most national eID
solutions rely on a Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) and X.509 certificates. The
Modinis-IDM study [20], the IDABC eID country reports [21], or [22, 23] give
an extensive overview of national eID solutions in Europe.
Giving the emerging trend towards cloud computing, identity management
gains also importance in this sector. Hence, different cloud identity models have
already been defined to cover new requirements particularly relating to cloud
computing [24, 25, 26, 27, 28]. The most promising model to fully feature the
cloud computing benefits is the operation of an identity provider in the cloud,
mostly in the role of an identity broker [29]. Examples for such implementations
are Fugen’s Cloud ID Broker9 or the SkIDentity project10. However, those
solutions totally neglect any privacy issues with respect to the cloud provider.
To bypass this issue, a handful of privacy-preserving cloud identity manage-
ment approaches have already emerged in the last years. For instance, Nunez
et al. [30] proposed the integration of proxy re-encryption into the OpenID
protocol. In follow-up work, they proposed a more generic privacy-preserving
cloud identity management model, which they call BlindIdM [31]. This model
also applies proxy re-encryption but relies on SAML instead of OpenID for the
transport protocol. A somewhat related architectural approach – but partic-
ularly focusing on eIDs – has been introduced in [32]. A completely different
approach based on anonymous credentials for privacy-preservation has been pro-
posed in [33].
Prior to this paper, in [34] we illustrate privacy-preserving design strategies
for migrating the basic Austrian eID architecture into the public cloud. The
three design strategies proposed there are based on proxy re-encryption, anony-
9http://fugensolutions.com/cloud-id-broker.html
10http://www.skidentity.com
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mous credentials, and fully homomorphic encryption respectively. Thereby, we
conclude that using proxy re-encryption is the most practical approach. How-
ever, [34] only investigates the basic use case of the Austrian eID system, namely
identification and authentication of Austrian citizens (see Section 4 for details).
In this paper we follow a similar approach using proxy re-encryption, but now
illustrate the migration of the complete Austrian identity infrastructure into the
public cloud. Thereby, we include the two other main uses cases (identification
and authentication in representation and foreign citizen authentication), which
in part have already been discussed previously in [35, 36]. However, we want to
emphasize that it is not a simple combination of these existing results, but we
aim at demonstrating that privacy-preserving identity management in public
clouds using proxy re-encryption is also possible for complex systems such as
the complete Austrian eID ecosystem, which has broad applicability.
3. Cryptographic Building Blocks
Subsequently, we review cryptographic building blocks that are required
within the proposed approach.
3.1. Digital Signatures
A digital signature scheme (DSS) is a triple (DSS.KG,DSS.Sign,DSS.Verify)
of efficient algorithms, where DSS.KG is a probabilistic key generation algo-
rithm that takes a security parameter κ and outputs a private and public key
pair (sk, pk). The (probabilistic) signing algorithm DSS.Sign takes as input a
message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ and a private (signing) key sk, and outputs a signature
σ. The verification algorithm DSS.Verify takes as input a public (verification)
key pk, a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ and a signature σ, and outputs a single bit
b ∈ {true, false} indicating whether σ is a valid signature for m under pk.
One requires a DSS to be correct, i.e., all honestly generated signatures verify,
and existentially unforgeable under adaptively chosen-message attacks (EUF-
CMA). In practice one typically employs the hash-then-sign paradigm, i.e., in-
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stead of inputting m into DSS.Sign and DSS.Verify, one inputs H(m) where H
is a suitable cryptographic hash function.
3.2. (Public Key) Encryption
A public key encryption (PKE) scheme is a triple (PKE.KG,PKE.Enc,PKE.Dec)
of efficient algorithms, where PKE.KG is a probabilistic key generation algorithm
that takes a security parameter κ and outputs a private and public key pair
(sk, pk). The probabilistic encryption algorithm PKE.Enc takes as input a public
key pk and a message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ and returns a ciphertext c = PKE.Enc(pk,m).
The decryption algorithm PKE.Dec takes as input a private key sk and a cipher-
text c and returns a message m = PKE.Dec(sk, c) or ⊥ in the case of failure.
A PKE scheme needs to be correct, i.e., decrypting a ciphertext yields the en-
crypted message, and at least indistinguishable under chosen plaintext attacks
(IND-CPA).
Abstractly, we can define private key (or symmetric) encryption schemes
(SE) analogously. SE.KG generates only a single key k which is used as input
to the encryption and decryption algorithms. For the security of a private key
encryption scheme (SE) one also requires at least IND-CPA security. Note that
when we speak of applying PKE to a message m, then we implicitly mean
applying hybrid encryption, i.e., generating a random key k of an SE scheme
and sending/storing the tuple (c1 = PKE.Enc(k, pk), c2 = SE.Enc(m, k)).
3.3. Redactable Signatures
A conventional DSS scheme does not allow for alterations of a signed mes-
sage without invalidating the signature. So called malleable signatures allow
to modify (specified) parts of a signed message without invalidating the signa-
ture. Malleable signature schemes which allow removal of parts (replacement
by some special symbol ⊥) by any party are called redactable signature (RS)
schemes [37, 38]. Basically, they can be constructed from any secure DSS rely-
ing on the hash-then-sign paradigm by virtue of modifying the construction of
the hash value (typically using randomized Merkle-Hash trees instead of a plain
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cryptographic hash of the entire message). Besides RS constructions for linear
documents, there are also approaches for tree-structured documents, e.g., XML
documents [39, 40]. Below, we present an abstract definition of redactable signa-
ture schemes. Henceforth we assume that a secure scheme for linear documents
is used and refer the reader to [37] for required security properties.
RS.KG: This probabilistic key generation algorithm takes a security parameter
κ and produces and outputs a private and public key pair (sk, pk).
RS.Sign: This (probabilistic) signing algorithm gets as input the signing key sk
and a message m = (m[1], . . . ,m[`]), split into blocks m[i] ∈ {0, 1}∗, and
outputs a signature σ = RS.Sign(sk,m).
RS.Verify: This deterministic signature verification algorithm gets as input a
public key pk, a message m = (m[1], . . . ,m[`]), m[i] ∈ {0, 1}∗, and a signa-
ture σ and outputs a single bit b = RS.Verify(pk,m, σ), b ∈ {true, false},
indicating whether σ is a valid signature for m under pk.
RS.Redact: This (probabilistic) redaction algorithm takes as input a message
m = (m[1], . . . ,m[`]), m[i] ∈ {0, 1}∗, a public key pk, a signature σ, and a
list MOD of indices of blocks to be redacted. It returns a modified message
and signature pair (mˆ, σˆ) = RS.Redact(m, pk, σ,MOD) or an error.
Note that for any redacted signature (mˆ, σˆ), we have that RS.Verify(pk, mˆ, σˆ) =
true holds.
3.4. Proxy Re-Encryption
Proxy re-encryption (RE) [41] is a public key encryption paradigm where
a semi-trusted proxy, given a transformation key, can transform a message en-
crypted under the key of party A into another ciphertext to the same message
such that another party B can decrypt with its private key. Although the proxy
can perform this re-encryption operation, it does not learn anything about the
encrypted message. According to the direction of this re-encryption operation,
such schemes can be classified into bidirectional, i.e., the proxy can transform
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from A to B and vice versa, and unidirectional, i.e., the proxy can convert in
one direction only, schemes. Furthermore, one can distinguish between multi-
use schemes, i.e., the ciphertext can be transformed from A to B to C etc., and
single-use schemes, i.e., the ciphertext can be transformed only once. More-
over, it is desirable that an RE scheme is non-interactive, i.e., a transformation
key from A to B can be locally computed by A, where only the public key of
B is required. In this approach we exemplary use the unidirectional multi-use
identity-based proxy re-encryption scheme of Green and Ateniese [42], as in
our setting we have a master authority (SRA), which can take care of the key
generation. For simplicity we omit the inclusion of the MaxLevels parameter
(indicating the maximum number of re-encryptions) in our definitions below
and note that this parameter needs to be adjusted as required.
RE.Setup: This probabilistic algorithm gets a security parameter κ. It outputs
the master public parameters params, which are distributed to users,
and the master private key msk, which is kept private. We assume that
params is available to all algorithms and do not explicitly indicate it.
RE.KG: This probabilistic key generation algorithm gets the master private
key msk, and an identity id ∈ {0, 1}∗ and outputs a private key skid
corresponding to identity id.
RE.Enc: This probabilistic encryption algorithm gets an identity id ∈ {0, 1}∗,
and a plaintext m and outputs cid = RE.Enc(id,m).
RE.RKGen: This probabilistic re-encryption key generation algorithm gets a
private key skid1 (derived via RE.KG), and two identities (id1, id2) ∈
({0, 1}∗)2 and outputs a re-encryption key
rkid1→id2 = RE.RKGen(skid1 , id1, id2).
RE.ReEnc: This (probabilistic) re-encryption algorithm gets as input a cipher-
text cid1 under identity id1 and a re-encryption key rkid1→id2 (generated
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by RE.RKGen) and outputs a re-encrypted ciphertext
cid2 = RE.ReEnc(cid1 , rkid1→id2).
RE.Dec: This decryption algorithm gets a private key skid, and a ciphertext
cid and outputs m = RE.Dec(skid, cid) or an error ⊥.
We note that as with PKE schemes one requires at least IND-CPA security.
4. The Austrian eID Concept
Unique identification is essential in sensitive areas of applications such as e-
Government. Especially if the number of users increases, such as the population
of a country, identification based on first name, last name, and date of birth
may be ambitious. Therefore, in Austria all citizens are registered in the Central
Register of Residence (CRR) and have a unique number assigned (CRR Num-
ber). However, this CRR number must not be used directly in e-Government
applications due to legal data protection restrictions. Therefore, the SourcePIN
Register Authority (SRA), a subdivision of the Austrian Data Protection Com-
mission, encrypts the CRR number to derive a new unique identifier, which is
called sourcePIN. The sourcePIN is stored on the Austrian citizen card in con-
junction with other identity data such as first name, last name, date of birth,
and a qualified signing certificate bound to the citizen’s identity. These identi-
fication data is wrapped in a special XML-based data structure, the so-called
Identity Link. The Identity Link is electronically signed by the SourcePIN Reg-
ister Authority, which ensures integrity and authenticity of the citizen’s identi-
fication data on the one side, and, on the other side, certifies the link between
identity data and the qualified signing certificate. The Identity Link is finally
solely stored on the Austrian citizen card. To provide compact descriptions, we
denote the Identity Link in a more general form by I = ((A1, a1), . . . , (Ak, ak))
as a sequence of attribute labels and attribute values.
To preserve citizen’s privacy, it is forbidden by law (based on the Austrian
e-Government Act) to directly use the sourcePIN for identification at online
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applications. According to this act, the sourcePIN must also never be stored
outside the Identity Link. Nevertheless, for still being able to uniquely identify
Austrian citizens at applications, the Austrian e-Government concept and strat-
egy foresees a sector-specific identification model. Thereby, a sector-specific PIN
(ssPIN) is derived from the combination of the sourcePIN and a governmental
sector identifier denoted as s (e.g., finance, tax, etc.) by using cryptographic
one-way hash functions. The use of one-way hash functions still ensures unique-
ness of the identifier (ssPIN). In addition, it is not possible to either re-calculate
the sourcePIN or an ssPIN of another sector out of a given ssPIN. The ssPIN
is finally used for unique identification at online applications.
The entire Austrian eID concept for natural persons relies on citizens being
registered in the CRR. However, persons not listed in the CRR (e.g., foreign
citizens or Austrian citizens currently residing in a foreign country) can be
registered in the so-called Supplementary Register for Natural Persons (SR).
By registering in the SR, these persons also get a sourcePIN assigned and hence
become part of the Austrian eID infrastructure. This way, foreign citizens can
be treated equally to Austrian citizens in online applications. The legal basis for
this treatment is the so-called E-Government Equivalence Decree, which became
law in 2010.
Besides identification and authentication of natural persons (being either an
Austrian or foreign citizen), the Austrian eID concept foresees electronic iden-
tification possibilities also for legal persons. Thereby, each legal person can be
uniquely identified by a number which has been registered in one of several
business registers for legal persons. Such registers are for instance the Com-
pany Register or the Central Register for Associations. In general, the overall
identification process is based on the usage of electronic mandates. Electronic
mandates can be used as electronic representations for legal persons, natural
persons, or for professional representatives (e.g., lawyers, notaries, etc.). On a
high level, for the representation of legal persons the unique number out of a
business register and the representative’s sourcePIN (natural person) form the
basis information for an electronic mandate. In case of representation of two
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natural persons, the sourcePIN of both the representative and the empowering
person (mandator) are taken for modelling the electronic mandate.
4.1. The Austrian Citizen Card Concept
The Austrian citizen card constitutes the official eID in Austria and is the
key component within the Austrian eID concept. The Austrian citizen card
concept is rather an abstract definition of a secure eID token than a concrete
implementation. Due to this technology-agnostic concept different citizen card
implementations exist. Current implementations in use are based on smart cards
or mobile phones. However, due to the abstract definition and the technology-
neutral concept also alternative approaches and implementations may be devel-
oped and rolled-out in the future.
Irrespective of the actual implementation, the citizen card provides the fol-
lowing functionality:
1. Identification and authentication of Austrian citizens
2. Qualified electronic signature creation
3. Encryption and decryption.
4. Data storage
The Austrian citizen card can be used for uniquely identifying citizens. Iden-
tification is based on the Identity Link, which is solely stored on the citizen
card and which includes identifying information such as the sourcePIN. Since
the sourcePIN cannot be used directly for identification at online applications
because of data protection restrictions, it will be derived according to sectors
which results in sector-specific PINs (ssPINs). These ssPINs are finally used
for identification at online e-Government applications. Authentication by using
the Austrian citizen card is carried out by generating a qualified electronic sig-
nature. The Austrian citizen card is capable for generating qualified electronic
signatures according to the EU Signature Directive. Signatures created accord-
ing to this directive are legally equivalent to handwritten signatures. However,
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this functionality is not only used for citizen authentication but also in other
applications such as PDF document signing. The third functionality consti-
tutes encryption and decryption. The citizen card includes an additional key
pair which allows for secure hardware-based decryption of arbitrary data.11 Fi-
nally, the third citizen card functionality is data storage, where data of arbitrary
format (e.g. XML documents or digital certificates) can be stored on the card.
For accessing citizen card functionality irrespective of its implementation,
an abstract access layer has been specified. This abstract layer hides implemen-
tation specifics from the application and enables access to citizen card function-
ality by using XML commands. Implementations of this abstract interface are
called Citizen Card Software (CCS). The CCS can be either installed locally on
the citizen’s computer or is provided remotely on a server.
4.2. The Austrian eID Architecture
The overall Austrian eID architecture involves several systems and compo-
nents. Figure 1 illustrates the Austrian eID architecture separated into opera-
tional domains. In the following, we briefly describe the individual components
and their basic functionality based on domain separation. Their interactions
and individual process flows supporting different use cases will be described in
the Section 4.3. Details on the Austrian eID architecture can also be found in
[43].
User Domain: A Citizen wants to access public or private sector service using
her Austrian citizen card. The Citizen Card Software, which enables easy
access to citizen card functionality, usually runs in the citizen’s domain.
Service Provider Domain: A service provider hosts one ore more public or
private sector online applications providing web-based services to citizens.
11In the remainder of this paper, we denote the signature key pair of the citizen C with
(pk′C , sk
′
C) and the encryption key pair with (pkC , skC). For details on the formalism, we
refer to Section 3.
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Figure 1: The Austrian eID Architecture
These services require qualified and secure identification and authentica-
tion of the Austrian citizen card. Identification and authentication for the
application is handled and managed by MOA-ID. On the one hand, MOA-
ID accesses citizen card functionality, and, on the other hand, provides
specific and authentic citizen data to the online application for further
processing.
SourcePIN Register Authority Domain: The Mandate Issuing Service (MIS)
is only invoked if citizens authenticate as representative for a natural or
legal person. The MIS issues electronic mandates on the fly. For querying
appropriate mandate information for natural person representation, the
MIS has to query the Bilateral Mandate Register (BMR). For fetching ap-
propriate mandate information for representing legal persons, an according
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Business Register - depending on the type of the legal person - needs to
be queried. To finish an authentication process using representation be-
tween natural persons, the SourcePIN Register (SPR) needs to be queried.
The SourcePIN Register is more ore less a virtual register, which bundles
the information of the Central Register of Residents (CRR) and the Sup-
plementary Register for Natural Persons (SR). The SourcePIN Register
Gateway, which is also operated within the SourcePIN Register Author-
ity Domain, is only invoked in the case of foreign citizen authentication.
Thereby, the SPR-GW facilitates the registration of foreign citizens in the
SR for MOA-ID.
Business Registers: In Figure 1 the individual business registers (Company
Register, Central Register of Associations, Supplementary Register for
Other Concerned Parties) are subsumed under one block for simplicity.
However, the individual registers are actually operated in different orga-
nizational domains. Operators are for instance the Austrian Ministry of
Justice or the Austrian Ministry of the Interior. These registers contain
information of legal persons and hence also mandate information for their
representation in electronic processes.
Foreign Country: In most cases, foreign citizens authenticate via the STORK
infrastructure. The STORK infrastructure, operated in the foreign coun-
try, queries an appropriate Foreign Identity Provider (F-IdP) for citizen
identification and authentication. Authenticated citizen data are trans-
ferred via the STORK infrastructure into the Austrian eID system (more
precisely to MOA-ID).
4.3. Identification and Authentication Use Cases
The individual components work all together to support different use cases.
In the following we briefly describe three identification and authentication use
cases. A detailed description of the interaction and communication between the
individual components will be done in Section 5.2.
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Identification and Authentication of Austrian Citizens: For identification
and authentication of Austrian citizens at online applications mainly the
component MOA-ID is responsible. MOA-ID handles the identification
process by reading and verifying the citizen’s Identity Link, and by deriv-
ing the sector-specific PIN from the citizen’s sourcePIN. Authentication
is carried out by qualified signature creation, stating the willingness of
authenticating at the online application. The citizen’s signature is veri-
fied by MOA-ID. The complete identification and authentication process
will be illustrated Figure 3, illustrating also the equalities and differences
between the current and the cloud process flow. The individual process
steps are described in detail in Section 5.2.1.
Identification and Authentication in Representation: In addition to MOA-
ID, in this scenario the Mandate Issuing Service (MIS) plays an important
role. If a citizen wants to represent another person (natural or legal per-
son) in an e-Government application, for successful authentication the
citizen needs to provide an authentic electronic mandate to the online
application. After the successful identification and authentication of an
Austrian citizen, the citizen can select an electronic mandate via the MIS,
which empowers her to represent the respective person. Details on this use
case will be given in Section 5.2.2. Figure 4 illustrates the identification
and authentication scenario when representing a legal person currently
and in the proposed cloud-based approach. For simplicity, we limit this
use case and its description to legal person representation only, as the
representation of natural persons is similar.
Identification and Authentication of Foreign Citizens: The Austrian eID
concept supports the secure identification and authentication of foreign
citizens using their nationally-issued eID. In other words, foreign EU cit-
izens can securely authenticate at Austrian online applications without
having the need to apply for an Austrian eID but can use their own na-
tional one. For an online application a foreign citizen identification and
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authentication process is completely transparent, i.e. the foreign citizen
can be treated equally to an Austrian citizen because the same citizen
data and data format is used for transmission. For the support of foreign
citizen identification and authentication, the Austrian eID architecture re-
lies internally on the SPR-GW and on the external components provided
by the foreign country (STORK infrastructure and F-IdP). Details on this
use case will be given in Section 5.2.3 and the corresponding Figure 5.
5. Porting the Austrian eID Architecture into the Public Cloud
As can be seen from Figure 1, the individual components have different
deployment approaches. For instance, MOA-ID follows a local deployment
approach, where each service provider operates one MOA-ID instance in its
domain. In comparison to that, the MIS and the SPR-GW are operated cen-
trally in the domain of the SourcePIN Register Authority. Additionally, the
deployment of the STORK infrastructure follows a central approach, where
each Member State operates a central gateway (PEPS) providing cross-border
eID functionality.
While the local deployment of MOA-ID has some clear advantages in terms of
end-to-end security or scalability, a central approach may be still advantageous.
Citizens could benefit from a central MOA-ID instance as they only need to trust
one specific identity provider. Additionally, a central instance of MOA-ID would
allow citizens single sign-on across different domains without re-authenticating
at each service provider and online application respectively every time. Also
service providers can benefit from such an approach as they do not require to
run and maintain a separate MOA-ID instance. Naturally, a central deployment
approach also has some drawbacks. Namely, a single instance constitutes a single
point of failure or attack. Moreover, the level of scalability cannot be reached
by a central approach compared to a local or distributed deployment.
Scalability is probably the main issue when considering a central deployment
of MOA-ID as all citizen authentication processes will run through this central
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instance. This can easily lead to load bottlenecks, as theoretically the whole
population of Austria could use this service. The same argument holds for the
MIS, the SPR-GW, or the PEPS, which are currently all deployed centrally
within a trusted environment. While the use of electronic mandates and cross-
border authentications are still in its start-up phase, frequent usages are to be
expected in the future.
Dealing with such increased load may not be easy to handle within the
current deployment scenarios, where each entity is deployed in a trusted data
center. Therefore, we propose a move of the individual entities (MOA-ID, MIS,
SPR-GW, PEPS) into a public cloud. Deployment in a public cloud could
definitely mitigates any scalability issues due to the characteristics provided by
a public cloud environment. However, a move of such trusted services into a
public cloud brings up new obstacles, especially with respect to citizen’s privacy.
While privacy in the current scenarios is ensured through organizational means
and mainly relies on trust, in the following sections we illustrate how such a
move of trusted services into a public cloud can be successfully realized using
cryptographic technologies by still preserving citizens’ privacy.
The selected cryptographic technologies for the described approach are based
on the results of a previous work [34], which illustrates privacy-preserving de-
sign strategies for migrating the basic Austrian eID architecture into the public
cloud only. In [34] the only use case that is analyzed is the identification and
authentication of Austrian citizens. According to the results in [34], the use of
proxy re-encryption and redactable signatures is considered to yield the most
practical approach. Thus, in this paper we continue our work by migrating
the complete Austrian eID architecture (covering the additional use cases on
electronic representation as well as foreign citizen identification and authentica-
tion) using proxy re-encryption and redactable signatures. While parts of the
two other main uses cases (identification and authentication in representation
and foreign citizen authentication) have previously been discussed in [35, 36],
in this paper we want to show the applicability of the resulting approach of [34]
in a complex systems such as the complete Austrian eID ecosystem (with all
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required components interacting with each other), which has broad applicability.
5.1. The Austrian eID Architecture in the Public Cloud
Figure 2: The Austrian eID Architecture in the Public Cloud
Figure 2 illustrates the new architecture of the Austrian eID system when
moving important components into the public cloud. In this figure, for simplic-
ity we subsumed the components MOA-ID, MIS, and SPR-GW to be deployed
in one public cloud. However, all three components could be operated by dif-
ferent public cloud providers. The STORK PEPS component is assumed to be
operated in a different public cloud, as it will be under responsibility of the
foreign country.
For being able to move the Austrian eID infrastructure into a public cloud, a
few minor changes in the corresponding infrastructure are necessary. In the next
sub-section, we explain in detail which changes are required. In the subsequent
sections, we describe the adapted process flows of the individual use cases to
support an operation of the Austrian eID system in a public cloud.
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5.2. Identification and Authentication Use Cases
5.2.1. Identification and Authentication of Austrian Citizens
Basically, similar to the current situation we assume the SourcePIN Register
Authority (SRA) as trusted entity. In this setup scenario, the SRA will be also
responsible for the issuance of a slightly modified Identity Link. Additionally,
the SRA will manage service provider registration to build appropriate trust
relationships between the individual entities.
Setup. In the proposed cloud scenario, we assume that the modified Identity
Link (denoted by I ′) does not contain a sourcePIN but furthermore all ssPINs
according to all governmental sectors. Furthermore, all ssPINs are encrypted
using a proxy re-encryption scheme, hence every (Ai, ai) ∈ I ′ is replaced by
the SRA by the encrypted attributes cai = RE.Enc(SRA, ai) . The ssPINs and
additional citizen attributes (e.g., name, date of birth) are encrypted under the
public key of MOA-ID (pkMOA-ID). The key pair (pkMOA-ID, skMOA-ID) is gen-
erated by the SRA. However, the SRA as trusted entity keeps the corresponding
private key (skMOA-ID) and thus MOA-ID will not be able to decrypt the indi-
vidual attributes. In the current approach, conventional signatures are used to
ensure authenticity and integrity of the Identity Link. However, in this cloud-
based approach the SRA signs the modified Identity Link using a redactable
signature scheme resulting in σI′ = RS.Sign(skSRA, I ′). By this, each indi-
vidual attribute of the modified Identity Link can be redacted. The modified
Identity Link I ′ is finally stored on the citizen card. In this setup, we further
assume that the signature creation certificate stored on the citizen card does
not contain any citizen identifying information.
In addition, service providers need to register their online applications at
the SRA. We denote the set of service providers S = {S1, . . . , S`}. For service
provider registration, the SRA produces a private key skSj = RE.KG(mskSRA, SJ)
for Sj and a re-encryption key rkMOA-ID→Sj = RE.RKGen(skMOA-ID,MOA-ID, Sj).
The key skSj is issued to Sj and rkMOA-ID→Sj to MOA-ID. We further assume
that an appropriate signing key pair (pk′MOA-ID, sk
′
MOA-ID) for MOA-ID is avail-
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able.
Process Flow. Figure 3 illustrates the process flow combining the current and
the cloud-based approach. In fact, the cloud process flow is very similar to
the current scenario. However, the differences in the cloud approach compared
to the current approach are highlighted in red in Figure 3. In the following,
the current eID process flow as well as necessary modifications for the cloud
deployment are described in detail.
Figure 3: Process flow of Austrian citizen identification and authentication in the cloud ap-
proach
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1. The citizen wants to access a protected resource at the online application,
which requires proper authentication.
2. The online application assembles a SAML authentication request, which
is transmitted via HTTP-Redirect to MOA-ID.
3a. In this step, MOA-ID sends an appropriate XML request to the CCS for
retrieving the Identity Link from the citizen card. For the cloud approach,
this request further includes now the governmental sector s.
3b. The citizen authorizes this request appropriately depending on the CCS
implementation.
3c.(new) By having s, the CCS can now redact all ssPINs except the ssPIN corre-
sponding to s.
3d. The identity link is returned to MOA-ID and verified. In the cloud ap-
proach, the redacted Identity Link I ′ is returned and verified.
4a. MOA-ID requests the creation of a qualified electronic signature indicating
the willingness of the citizen for online application authentication.
4b. The citizen authorizes this request appropriately depending on the CCS
implementation.
4c. The citizen creates a signature, which is sent back to MOA-ID and verified.
5a.(n/a) MOA-ID derives the appropriate ssPIN out of the sourcePIN for the sector
the online application belongs to. This step is not applicable in the cloud
approach as the sourcePIN as well as the ssPIN are valuable assets which
must not to be disclosed to the cloud provider.
5b.(new) Instead of deriving an ssPIN, MOA-ID re-encrypts the attributes cai of
the redacted Identity Link I ′ for the authentication requesting service
provider Sj by using the re-encryption key rkMOA-ID→Sj . This results in
cSj = RE.ReEnc(rkMOA-ID→Sj , cai).
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5c. In the current approach MOA-ID assembles a SAML assertion/response,
which includes the ssPIN and additional citizen data out of the Identity
Link. In the cloud approach, MOA-ID signs the result coming out with
σMOA-ID = DSS.Sign(skMOA-ID, cSj ). However, more precisely also in the
cloud approach the complete SAML assertion/response is signed.
6. MOA-ID returns the SAML assertion/response to the online application
via HTTP-POST. Compared to the current approach, where attributes
are included in plain in the SAML message, in the cloud approach the
SAML message includes re-encrypted attributes only.
7a. The online application verifies the SAML response (σMOA-ID), extracts its
(enrypted) attributes.
7b.(new) The encrypted citizen attributes cSj are decrypted using the private key
skSj .
8. After successful verification, the online application grants access to the
resource.
5.2.2. Identification and Authentication in Representation
Identification and authentication in representation requires a successful iden-
tification and authentication of an Austrian citizen as a prerequisite. After that,
the Austrian citizen is eligible to select an electronic mandate containing nec-
essary empowerment information for representing a natural or legal person. In
the following, we first give details on the setup for supporting a migration of this
use case into a cloud environment. In addition, we give details on the process
flow highlight similarities and difference between the current process steps and
the steps required in a cloud deployment.
Setup. In this scenario, we again assume that the modified Identity Link I ′ is
used. Furthermore, in this scenario we additionally rely on the encryption and
decryption functionality of the Austrian citizen card. Besides a signature key
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pair, each Austrian citizen C has an encryption key pair (pkC , skC) stored on
her citizen card. This key pair is also generated by the SRA.
In addition to (pkSj , skSj ) and rkMOA-ID→Sj , the SRA has to generate addi-
tional encryption and re-encryption keys for the individual entities required for
mandate processing. For the MIS and for the CR the keys (pkMIS , skMIS) and
(pkCR, skCR) are created. Since the MIS will be operated in the cloud, the SRA
keeps secret skMIS and only distributes pkMIS to the MIS. In addition, the
following re-encryption keys are generated: rkMOA-ID→MIS , rkMIS→CR, and
rkMIS→MOA-ID. We further assume that appropriate signing keys are avail-
able for the individual entities: (pk′MOA-ID, sk
′
MOA-ID), (pk
′
MIS , sk
′
MIS), and
(pk′CR, sk
′
CR).
Process Flow. Figure 4 illustrates the process flow for representative authen-
tication in the current and in the cloud-based approach. In the following, we
describe the process flow in detail.
1. This process step is equal to normal and cloud-based Austrian citizen
authentication (cf. Section 5.2.1). However, the citizen indicates that
she wants to authenticate on behalf of somebody (e.g., by activating a
checkbox).
2. This process step is equal to normal and cloud-based Austrian citizen
authentication (cf. Section 5.2.1).
3a. In the current scenario, this process step is equal to normal Austrian citi-
zen authentication (cf. Section 5.2.1). For the cloud-based approach, this
process step is only similar to cloud-based Austrian citizen authentica-
tion. When MOA-ID sends a request for retrieving the Identity Link to
the CCS, the request includes the governmental sector the service provider
belongs to and the governmental sectors the individual registers storing
mandate information belong to.
3b.(new) Similar to the cloud-based Austrian citizen authentication approach, the
CCS redacts all ssPINs which are not required in this authentication sce-
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Figure 4: Process flow representing a legal person electronically in the cloud approach
nario. This includes all ssPINs except the one the service provider belongs
to (ssPINSP ) and the ssPINs required for querying the individual regis-
ters for mandate information (ssPINCR in this example).
3c. This process step is equal to normal and cloud-based Austrian citizen
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authentication (cf. Section 5.2.1).
4. This process step is equal to normal and cloud-based Austrian citizen
authentication (cf. Section 5.2.1).
5.(new) In this step, MOA-ID re-encrypts the attribute ssPINCR from I ′ for the
MIS using rkMOA-ID→MIS resulting in cMIS = RE.ReEnc(rkMOA-ID→MIS , ssPINCR).
This re-encryption result is signed by MOA-ID which outputs σMOA−ID =
DSS.Sign(sk′MOA-ID, cMIS).
6. Since the citizen wants to authenticate on behalf of somebody, the MIS is
queried by MOA-ID for accessing all mandates the citizen is empowered.
For that, in the current approach MOA-ID sends the citizen’s Identity
Link to the MIS.
In the cloud-based approach MOA-ID sends the tuple (cMIS , σMOA-ID) to
the MIS for mandate retrieval.
7a.(n/a) Out of the sourcePIN from the Identity Link, the MIS calculates all ap-
propriate ssPINs for querying the individual registers. For simplicity, in
this scenario the authors illustrate the query process at the company reg-
ister (CR) only. This step is not applicable in the cloud approach as the
sourcePIN as well as the ssPINs are valuable assets which must not to be
disclosed to the cloud provider.
7b.(new) The MIS verifies σMOA-ID and re-encrypts cMIS for the CR using rkMIS→CR
and signs the result cCR. The resulting signature is denoted as σMIS =
DSS.Sign(sk′MIS , cCR).
8a. In the current approach, the MIS searches the CR for registered man-
dates using the corresponding ssPINCR of the citizen. In the cloud-
based approach, the MIS sends (cCR, σMIS) to the CR. The CR verifies
σMIS , decrypts cCR, and searches its register for mandates using the plain
ssPINCR. In our example, we assume that the mandate information
mand and the corresponding mandate ID mandID has been found. The
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CR signs the mandate and the signature σCR = DSS.Sign(skCR,mand‖mandID)
is calculated.
8b.(new) Since the citizen is known to the CR (the mandate contains further infor-
mation of the citizen), it can encrypt the mandate for the citizen using
pkC resulting in cC = PK.Enc(pkC ,mand‖mandID‖σCR). The CR again
signs the encryption result for ensuring integrity and authenticity calcu-
lating σ′CR = DSS.Sign(skCR, cC).
8c. In the current approach, the CR returns all registered mandate informa-
tion for this citizen. In the cloud-based approach, the data (cC , σ
′
CR) are
returned to the MIS, which verifies the signature12.
9a. The MIS presents the citizen a selection page of all available mandates for
her. In the cloud-based example, cC is sent to the citizen.
9b.(new) The citizen decrypts cC and verifies σCR.
9c. The citizen selects the mandate she wants to use for authentication. In
this scenario we assume that she wants to act on behalf of a company
and thus selects mandID. In the cloud-based approach, the citizen signs
mandID resulting in σC = DSS.Sign(skC ,mandID). (mandID, σC) are
returned to the MIS.
10.(n/a) The MIS assembles all necessary mandate information and signs these data
to generate an electronic mandate according to the specification defined
by [44]. Amongst others, this electronic mandate contains information of
the citizen, who represents the company, the company, and the type of
empowerment the citizen is allowed to act on behalf. This step is not
applicable in the cloud approach as the mandate information is a valuable
asset which must not to be disclosed to the cloud provider.
12In our scenario, for simplicity the CR has been queried for mandate information only.
However, the MIS actually queries all registers that have mandate information available.
28
11a.(new) The MIS queries again the CR for retrieving all necessary information for
the selected mandate by using (mandID, σC).
11b.(new) The CR calculates cMIS = RE.Enc(MIS,mand‖mandID) and signs it
resulting in σ′′CR = DSS.Sign(sk
′
CR, cMIS).
11c.(new) The CR transmits (cMIS , σ
′′
CR) to the MIS.
12. The MIS verifies σ′′CR and re-encrypts cMIS for MOA-ID, i.e., computes
cMOA-ID = RE.ReEnc(cMIS , rkMIS→MOA-ID). The MIS signs this re-encryption
result cMOA-ID by calculating the signature σ
′
MIS = DSS.Sign(sk
′
MIS , cMOA-ID).
The steps 11a.-12. are only required in the cloud-based approach.
13. In the current approach, the MIS returns the electronic mandate to MOA-
ID. In the cloud-based approach, the MIS returns (cMOA-ID, σ
′
MIS) to
MOA-ID. MOA-ID verifies σ′MIS .
14.(new) MOA-ID re-encrypts the data cMOA-ID, encrypted ssPINSP , and cai for
Sj using the key rkMOA-ID→Sj . The result cSj is additionally signed using
sk′MOA-ID resulting in σ
′
MOA-ID. MOA-ID assembles (cSj , σ
′
MOA-ID) in the
SAML response.
15. MOA-ID assembles an appropriate SAML assertion/response including
the electronic mandate and transmits it to the online application.
16a. The online application verifies the response. In the cloud-based approach,
the online application verifies the signature σ′MOA-ID.
16b.(new) The online application decrypts the mandate and citizen information cSj
by using the key skSj
17. If verification is successful the online application grants access. The citizen
is now able to do online procedures on behalf of the selected company.
5.2.3. Identification and Authentication of Foreign Citizens
In this section the identification and authentication of foreign citizen in the
current approach and in the cloud approach are described in more detail.
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Setup. In the previous scenarios we assumed the SRA to be the trusted entity
that issues appropriate key material to the involved entities in the Austrian
eID system. In this scenario we have to deal with a cross-border scenario,
hence we need a trusted entity being able to serve entities across borders. In
the current STORK concept, the European Commission (EC) plays a central
role managing trust across the involved STORK entities. Therefore, also for
our scenario we assume the EC being the entity that issues secure key ma-
terial to the individual STORK entities and thus we skip a detailed descrip-
tion on that. In this scenario, the EC generates (pkPEPS , skPEPS) and issues
pkPEPS to the PEPS only. It keeps secret skPEPS . Furthermore, the SRA
issues (pkMOA−ID, skMOA−ID), (pkSPR−GW , skSPR−GW ), (pkSP , skSP ), and
(pkSR, skSR). It keeps secret skMOA−ID and skSPR−GW . The other keys are
distributed to the respective entities. In addition, EC generates a re-encryption
key rkPEPS→MOA−ID and the SRA the re-encryption keys rkMOA−ID→SPR−GW ,
rkSPR−GW→SR, and rkMOAID→SP . For further explanations, we denote the
identity data of the foreign citizen as fcdata.
We further assume that appropriate signing keys are available for the indi-
vidual entities: (pk′MOA-ID, sk
′
MOA-ID), (pk
′
PEPS , sk
′
PEPS), (pk
′
F−IdP , sk
′
F−IdP ),
(pk′SPR−GW , sk
′
SPR−GW ), and (pk
′
SR, sk
′
SR).
Process Flow. Figure 5 illustrates the process flow identifying and authenticat-
ing a foreign citizen in the current and cloud-based approach. In the following,
we describe the process flow in detail.
1. A foreign EU citizen wants to access a service of an Austrian online ap-
plication.
2. The online application assembles an appropriate SAML authentication
request and sends it to MOA-ID.
3. MOA-ID presents the foreign citizen a page where the citizen can select
her country of origin.
4. The citizen provides her home country she originates from.
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Figure 5: Process flow representing identifying and authenticating a foreign citizen in the
cloud approach
5. According to the STORK idea, the foreign citizen will be authenticated in
her home country. Therefore, the citizen is redirected to a single gateway
(PEPS) in the foreign country, being part of the STORK infrastructure.
For starting this authentication process, MOA-ID transmits a STORK
authentication request to the foreign PEPS. The PEPS selects an appro-
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priate foreign IdP (F-IdP), where the citizen actually authenticates.
6. The PEPS forwards the authentication request to the F-IdP.
7. The F-IdP requests the citizen to authenticate using a qualified signature.
8. The qualified signature is returned to the F-IdP.
9. In the current approach, the F-IdP provides the qualified signature as
well as other citizen identifying information (first name, last name, date
of birth, identifier) to the PEPS. In the cloud-based approach, we as-
sume the Foreign IdP to be a trusted entity and that it encrypts the
foreign citizen’s identification data for the PEPS using pkPEPS resulting
in cPEPS = RE.Enc(PEPS, fcdata). Furthermore, cPEPS is signed using
sk′F−IdP resulting in σF−IdP . Both results (cPEPS , σF−IdP ) are sent to
the PEPS. The PEPS verifies σF−IdP .
10.(new) The PEPS re-encrypts cPEPS for MOA-ID using rkPEPS→MOA-ID into
cMOA-ID. In addition, cMOA-ID is signed using sk
′
PEPS resulting in σPEPS .
11. In the current approach, the PEPS assembles the citizen data retrieved
from the F-IdP and returns a STORK response to MOA-ID. In the cloud-
based approach, the tuple (cMOA-ID, σPEPS) is sent to MOA-ID. MOA-ID
verifies σPEPS .
12.(new) MOA-ID again re-encrypts the foreign citizen data for the SPR-GW to
cSPR−GW = RE.ReEnc(rkMOA-ID→SPR−GW , cMOA-ID). cSPR−GW and the
governmental sector s of the SP is signed resulting in σMOA−ID = DSS.Sign(sk′MOA-ID, cSPR−GW ‖s).
13. MOA-ID extracts this information and sends it to the SPR-GW. The SPR-
GW verifies the citizen’s signature. In the cloud-based approach, the tuple
(cSPR−GW , s, σMOA−ID) is sent to the SPR-GW. The SPR-GW verifies
σMOA−ID.
14.(new) The SPR-GW does the re-encryption for the SR: cSR = RE.ReEnc(rkSPRGW→SR, cSPR−GW ).
Again, the values cSR and s are signed resulting in σSPR−GW .
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15a. The SPR-GW queries the SR to register the foreign citizen in the Sup-
plementary Register for Natural Persons (SR) based on the information
received. This registration into the SR is legally based on the Austrian
e-Government act [45] and the Austrian e-Government equivalence decree
[46]. In the cloud-based approach, the tuple (cSR, s, σSPR−GW ) is sent to
the SPR-GW.
15b.(new) The SR verifies σSPR−GW , decrypts cSR using skSR, and registers the
foreign citizen. During registration, a new modified Identity Link I ′ is
created for the foreign citizen. Since the modified Identity Link is created
on the fly, it just contains the encrypted ssPIN for the sector s and all
other ssPINs are redacted.
15c. The SR calculates a sourcePIN for the citizen, creates and assembles an
Identity Link, and returns the signed Identity Link to the SPR-GW. In
the cloud-based approach, the new modified Identity Link I ′ is encrypted
for the SPR-GW using pkSPR−GW resulting in c′SPR−GW . The result
c′SPR−GW is signed by applying σSR = DSS.Sign(sk
′
SR, c
′
SPR−GW ). Both
results (c′SPR−GW , σSR) are transferred to the SR. The SPR-GW again
verifies σSR.
16.(new) The SPR-GW again re-encrypts c′SPR−GW to c
′
MOA-ID = RE.ReEnc(rkSPRGW→MOA-ID, c
′
SPR−GW ),
and signs the result c′MOA-ID applying σ
′
SPR−GW = DSS.Sign(sk
′
SPR−GW , c
′
MOA-ID).
17. The SPR-GW returns the Identity Link to MOA-ID. In the cloud-based
approach, the re-encrypted Identity Link c′MOA-ID and σ
′
SPR−GW are trans-
mitted to MOA-ID. MOA-ID verifies σSPR−GW .
18a.(n/a) MOA-ID derives the appropriate ssPIN out of the sourcePIN for the sector
the online application belongs to. This step is not applicable in the cloud
approach as the sourcePIN as well as the ssPIN are valuable assets which
must not to be disclosed to the cloud provider.
18b. MOA-ID re-encrypts to cSP = RE.ReEnc(rkMOA-ID→SP , c′MOA-ID), and
signs cSP applying σ
′
MOA-ID = DSS.Sign(sk
′
MOA-ID, cSP ).
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18c. MOA-ID assembles a SAML assertion/response to be transferred to the
SP. In the cloud-based approach the SAML response includes cSP and
σ′MOA-ID .
19.-21. These process steps are equal to normal and cloud-based Austrian citizen
authentication (cf. Section 5.2.1). In the cloud-based approach, the online
application verifies σ′MOA-ID and decrypts cSP using skSP .
6. Analysis and Discussion of the Proposed Model
In this section we discuss the proposed migration of the Austrian eID system
into the public cloud concerning security and privacy as wells practicability
aspects.
6.1. Security and Privacy Discussion
Our work is based on the assumption that a cloud provider hosting or op-
erating an entity is acting honest but curious [47, 31], i.e., the cloud provider
operates and works correctly but is not trusted with respect to (data) privacy13.
In this section we investigate and discuss which personal and sensitive data are
disclosed to an entity of the Austrian eID system operated in a public cloud.
We thereby compare the information disclosed or seen, respectively, by an en-
tity operated by a public cloud provider. Table 1 illustrates the comparison of
the current Austrian eID system and the ported eID system to the cloud with
respect to personal or sensitive data disclosed. Since encrypted data is seen as
privacy-preserving data, any encrypted data disclosed at an entity in the cloud
will not be mentioned.
The comparison Table 1 follows the structure of the previous chapters and
sections, where three different use cases for the Austrian eID system are dis-
13A discussion of security and privacy issues when acting with a totally untrusted cloud
provider is out of scope of this work and left for future work. However, under such an
assumption data confidentiality and data integrity can still be ensured due to the use of
encryption and signature technologies.
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tinguished (Identification and Authentication of citizens, in representation, of
foreign citizens). In the following, privacy-sensitive data, which is revealed to
the individual components, is discussed in detail. However, we only compare
those components which are finally ported into the public cloud as they can be
considered untrusted with respect to privacy. All other components are trusted
and thus do not need a further analysis.
Identification and Authentication of citizens:
In this use case only MOA-ID is involved, hence only this component needs
to be investigated with respect to privacy. In the current scenario the citizen’s
identity link (including her name, date of birth and sourcePIN) is exposed to
MOA-ID. Additionally, MOA-ID knows the governmental sector of the applica-
tion the user wants to authenticate and thus also the ssPIN, which is derived
out of the citizen’s sourcePIN by MOA-ID. Finally, also the citizen’s signing
certificate is disclosed to MOA-ID.
In contrast to this data set, in the cloud-based approach only the govern-
mental sector of the application the citizen wants to log in remains visible to
MOA-ID and the cloud provider respectively. All other data is transferred in
encrypted form to MOA-ID only.
Identification and Authentication in representation:
In this scenario the components MOA-ID and MIS are involved. Equal of the
previous use case, in the current approach MOA-ID gets to know the citizen’s
identity link (including her name, date of birth and sourcePIN), the citizen’s
signing certificate, and subsequently the governmental sector of the application
and the citizen’s ssPIN. The identity link data is also disclosed to the MIS.
Since the MIS handles all relevant functionality with respect to authentication
on behalf, the MIS also sees all all registered mandate information of the citi-
zen. The reason is that the MIS queries all available registers to find existing
mandate information for the authenticating citizen. This mandate information
is bundled at the MIS for displaying it to the user. After selecting a mandate by
the user, the MIS also knows which mandate has been selected. Due to that, the
MIS also gets the information of the empowering mandator. Since MOA-ID and
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the MIS are interconnected, for fulfilling a successful authentication process in
representation all selected mandate information (mandate type, mandator, em-
powerment, etc.) is also disclosed to MOA-ID. Hence, a lot personal information
is disclosed to both components.
Having a look at the cloud approach again, only a minimum of those data
are disclosed to MOA-ID and the MIS in this setup. During an authentication
process in representation, the MIS only learns the ID (mandID) of the selected
mandate by the citizen. In addition, MOA-ID only gets to know the govern-
mental sector of the application. No further privacy-sensitive data is disclosed
to either MOA-ID or the MIS because it is processed in encrypted form only.
Identification and Authentication of foreign citizens:
In this use case the components MOA-ID, SPR-GW, and PEPS are involved.
Already at the start of an authentication request, MOA-ID gets to know the
citizen’s home country because MOA-ID needs to forward the citizen to the
respective PEPS for authentication. After successful authentication of the for-
eign citizen at the F-IdP, all requested citizen data (name, date of birth, unique
identifier, signing certificate)14 is disclosed to the PEPS for further processing.
All these data is returned from the PEPS to MOA-ID, thus these data is also
disclosed MOA-ID. For registering the foreign citizen in the Austrian Supple-
mentary Register of Residents, these data are forwarded by MOA-ID to the
SPR-GW. Out of the signing certificate, the SPR-GW also gets to know the
citizen’s home country. The SPR-GW registers the citizen and as return data it
receives the Austrian identity link of the foreign citizen. This identity link also
includes the Austrian unique identifier (sourcePIN), which constitutes sensitive
information. The identity link is further exposed to MOA-ID, which uses the
governmental sector and the sourcePIN for calculation of the ssPIN.
14The STORK framework and protocol also supports the transfer of many more attributes.
However, for the authentication at an Austrian service provider the name, date of birth,
unique identifier, and signing certificate are sufficient, hence we skip a detailed discussion of
additional attributes.
36
Again, compared to all exposed information described above in the current
setting, only the governmental sector of the application is disclosed to MOA-
ID in the cloud approach. No further sensitive information is disclosed to any
of the components MOA-ID, SPR-GW, or PEPS. All data is only available in
encrypted form at these components.
6.2. Practicability Discussion
In this section the proposed cloud approach based on selected criteria with
respect to to practicability is discussed. The following criteria were selected:
Re-Use of Existing Infrastructure: When designing the proposed solution,
one criterion was that the existing infrastructure should not severely al-
tered or changed. This particularly includes the architecture and the func-
tionality of the individual components. When comparing the Figures 1 and
2 it can be seen that the overall architecture remains the same instead of
the migration of MOA-ID, MIS, SPR-GW, and PEPS into a public cloud.
Even the message and transport protocols used to exchange messages be-
tween the individual components do not require heavy changes. The ex-
change messages and protocols need to support the transfer of encrypted
data in the cloud-based approach. In addition, also trusted components
need to be made capable of encryption functionality. However, this keeps
the effort to a minimum, hence no severe changes to the Austrian eID
infrastructure need are made.
Conformance to Current Process Flow: Another design criterion for our
approach was staying conform to the current process flow. While in general
conformity is mostly given, changes in the process flow are required to keep
the high level of security and privacy-preservation with respect to the cloud
providers. However, those process flow changes can be seen as minimal as
they are only related to encryption, re-encryption, or additional signature
steps.
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Scalability: The main aim of this work was to guarantee high scalability for
central services even at a huge number of users. This aim is mainly realized
by migrating important components such as MOA-ID, SPR-GW, or the
MIS, where high load can be expected, into public clouds. Of course, load
bottlenecks might occur at trusted message endpoints such as individual
registers or the F-IdP for the foreign citizen use case. However, those
situations are probably very unlikely because not for all citizens the same
registers need to be queried at the same time or foreign citizens will not
use the same F-IdP at the same time.
Governance Structure: For the current situation there is a proper gover-
nance structure in place. Meaning, proper trust relationships are (e.g.
based on digital certificates) between the individual components. How-
ever, the use of re-encryption functionality adds an additional layer of
governance requirements. Encryption and decryption key pairs as well as
re-encryption keys need to be properly distributed amongst the involved
components. This puts some additional complexity to the SRA for use
cases involving Austrian citizens only. In addition, also the European
Commission and foreign countries are affected as re-encryption function-
ality is also required across borders. In particular, key management and
distribution based on a public key infrastructure (PKI) to the individual
components needs to be carried out properly. However, the effort for these
tasks can be considered reasonable as the number of involved components
is limited (In Austria besides MOA-ID, SPR-GW, and the MIS a few reg-
isters and several service providers, in foreign countries besides the PEPS
especially different F-IdPs).
6.3. Related Work Discussion
Related Work on using Proxy Re-Encryption: One of the first approaches
using proxy re-encryption for identity management in the cloud appeared
in [30], which integrated proxy re-encryption into the OpenID protocol.
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They continued their work by creating a generalized model called Blin-
dIdM (A Privacy-Preserving Approach for Identity Management as a
Service) [31]. The applicability of BlindIdM was further demonstrated
by integrating proxy re-encryption functionality into SAML. However,
[30, 31] rely on proxy re-encryption for privacy preservation only, whereas
our approach additionally uses on redactable signatures, as an additional
privacy-preserving mechanism ensuring integrity and authenticity at the
same time.
Related Work on using Anonymous Credentials: Anonymous Credential
systems (aka Privacy ABCs) are a valuable mechanism for ensuring pri-
vacy in identity management and have been discussed in context of eID
systems, e.g, their integration in the German eID architecture [33]. While
early implementations of anonymous credential systems, e.g., idemix [48]
on a Java Card [49], however, were too expensive from the user’s (client’s)
perspective, state-of-the-art implementations [50, 51, 52] already achieve
reasonable efficiency. While anonymous credentials are a valuable means
for ensuring privacy in identity management, performance is typically still
much slower than when using proxy re-encryption.
7. Conclusions
The Austrian eID system plays a major role in the Austrian e-Government
strategy. Its main functions are unique identification and secure authentication
of Austrian citizens, in representation on behalf of a natural or legal person,
or foreign citizen authentication. The current Austrian eID system is based
on several components, which are interconnected amongst others. Some of the
components are deployed locally (MOA-ID), others centrally (MIS, SPR-GW,
PEPS). In general, a central deployment of each individual component is prefer-
able. For instance, a central deployment saves service providers a lot of oper-
ational and maintenance costs. However, a central deployment can easily lead
to load bottlenecks and scalability issues when the frequency of identification
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and authentication processes increases. Theoretically, the entire population of
Austria and – going beyond boarders – of whole Europe will be able to use and
run authentications through the Austrian eID system.
To overcome such scalability bottlenecks in the future, in this paper we pre-
sented a solution by moving important centralized services of the Austrian eID
system (MOA-ID, MIS, SPR-GW, and PEPS) into a public cloud which consid-
erably improves scalability. By applying appropriate cryptographic technologies
we are able to improve scalability by preserving citizen’s privacy with respect
to the public cloud providers at the same time. We therefore can conclude that
for all identification and authentication use cases no sensitive personal informa-
tion will be disclosed to a public cloud provider in the cloud-based approach
since all data processed in the cloud is encrypted. This strongly preserves
citizen’s privacy even if public cloud providers assuming to be acting honest
but curious are involved in the proposed architecture. In addition, no major
changes to existing infrastructure or the current process flows are required. Only
decryption/encryption/re-encryption functionality need to be additionally sup-
ported by the individual components and the data transfer protocols must be ca-
pable of encrypted data. However, efforts for implementing encryption function-
ality might be low and encrypted data can also easily transmitted by standard
data exchange protocols such as SAML [31] or OpenID [30]. Finally, a proper
governance structure for additional management of encryption/decryption/re-
encryption keys needs to be setup. Nevertheless, this can be easily integrated
into existing organizational procedures.
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Table 1: Comparison of personal data disclosure between the current and the cloud-based
approach
Approach Use Case
Component
MOA-ID MIS SPR-GW PEPS
Current Approach
Austrian Citi-
zens
• Identity Link
(name, date
of birth,
sourcePIN)
• ssPIN
• Signing certifi-
cate
•Governmental
sector
- - -
In Representa-
tion
• Identity Link
(name, date
of birth,
sourcePIN)
• ssPIN
• Signing certifi-
cate
•All informa-
tion of the
mandate
• Selected man-
date for appli-
cation
•Governmental
sector
• Identity Link
(name, date
of birth,
sourcePIN)
• ssPIN
• Signing certifi-
cate
•All registered
mandate infor-
mation of the
citizen
• Selected man-
date for appli-
cation
•Governmental
sector
- -
Foreign Citi-
zens
•Citizen’s home
country
•All requested
citizen data
(name, date
of birth,
identifier)
• Signing certifi-
cate
• Identity Link
(sourcePIN,
etc.)
• ssPIN
•Governmental
sector
- •Citizen’s home
country
•All requested
citizen data
(name, date
of birth,
identifier)
• Signing certifi-
cate
• Identity Link
(sourcePIN,
etc.)
•All requested
citizen data
(name, date
of birth,
identifier)
• Signing certifi-
cate
Cloud-based
Approach
Austrian Citi-
zens
•Governmental
sector
- - -
In Representa-
tion
•Governmental
sector
•MandateID - -
Foreign Citi-
zens
•Governmental
sector
- - -
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